Mt. San Jacinto Outdoor Recreation

Suppose there are 7 ballots put into the mail, with 4 votes for Candidate A and 3 votes for candidate B.
1:A, 2:B, 3:A, 4:A, 5:B, 6:B, 7:A

Now let's pretend we are cheating to get Candidate B elected by altering the vote counts.

Late at night at the post office we scan the envelopes with either a far-IR scanner (like millimeter airport scanners that see through clothes), UVC, or near X-ray with optimized wavelength to read the votes inside without opening envelopes. We shred ballot 7 which was a vote for A. Cameras are turned off, and hopefully that day's footage is overwritten before anybody checks the video footage.

The other 6 envelopes are delivered to the polling place. Now the voter of ballot 7 may notice their vote was not recorded, but we can say we were busy and create delivery chaos in the mail system.

We've also bribed programmers of the voting machines in the building (90% in USA are from 3 companies). The day before the election the machines behave honestly during the pre-election test where people clap and have a warm feeling inside while celebrating the democratic republic, but on election day they switch to become dishonest. (Much like the Volkswagen emissions scandal.)

Stored inside the voting machines and the auditing software is malicious code with identical copies of this randomly-generated array and a random variable or constant.

bool random_alterations[6] = {1,0,0,1,0,1}; // Add 1 to indices. 0-5 becomes 1-6.
uint8_t non_rigged_batch = 2;

If the auditing software is open-source, then we download the source code, insert our malicious code, compile, and install on a computer for election officials because the opposing party won't bother with checksum hashes and digital signatures, right? And if there's only 1 signature to check, then we can bribe that 1 person or hack their computer. We know that batch 2 will get a hand recount because we altered the code. This same method could also be done with precinct recounts.

Now the ballots arrive at the polling place and are randomly sorted into 3 batches:
Batch 1 is 3:A 2:B
Batch 2 is 1:A 5:B
Batch 3 is 4:A 6:B

The machines do not alter batch 2 in order to pass the "random" hand recount as part of the audit process. For batch 1 and batch 3, the machine checks the random_alterations array. Indices 0-5 correspond to ballots 1-6 because us humans like to start counting at 1. The one's mean alter A votes to B votes or leave B votes unaltered. The zero's mean no alterations. Ballot 4 is changed from A to B, so we get this altered data set:
1:A, 2:B, 3:A, 4:B, 5:B, 6:B

Results are 2 votes for A and 4 votes for B. Candidate B wins! And on a larger scale, the randomization of the decisions would not produce statistical anomalies, much like the 1-time pad method of encryption.

If election laws require switching machines for machine recounts, that doesn't matter because all machines in the building have the same malicious code and produce identical alterations. Machine recounts are perfect!

Now where we run into trouble is if the hand recounts are truly random such as rolling a 6-sided die and dividing by 2. If somebody rolls a 6 that means batch 3 would be hand-counted. Uh oh, that's a problem for us. We altered ballot 4 in batch 3. So how do we get around this? Well we can take inspiration from the Bernie Madoff scam. He created fake portfolios for his clients, but because they couldn't access his business records or see other clients' portfolios, they didn't have enough information to see that the data was falsified. When an election volunteer counts batch 3 they see 1 vote for A and 1 vote for B. Then the elections official logs into the voting software which displays 1 vote for A and 1 vote for B, even though it counted 2 votes for B in the results calculation. Ideally, we never export the entire data set to be viewed as a spreadsheet in any other software like Excel or Libre Office. But if we are required to export a CSV file, then we cross our fingers and hope nobody checks ballot 4 or batch 3 in the spreadsheet.

These cheating methods do not require any communication between machines or computers.

Thoughts? Could these things happen?

I posted here because I've been censored on Reddit. I tried posting in related forums, and I am blocked. I don't mind if people criticize the theory, but at least allow free speech.

8 computer security experts are calling for recounts.
https://freespeechforpeople.org/compute ... ification/
(This has nothing to do with Starlink and bullet ballots. That guy might be delusional.)

Physically accessing 1 machine is a way to alter other machines in the future. Even with a locking microchip, it's possible to burn through the casing with nitric acid and use a UV light to disable the lock. Then a hacker can download the machine code, run it through a decompiler to create source code that is challenging for humans to read, and use AI to create source code that is more understandable. Then the hacker would insert malicious code, compile, and load onto other machines by the same manufacturer months in advance of an election.

I've been told that this verification method proves that we can trust the voting machines (tabulators), at least on a large scale across numerous counties.
https://www.eac.gov/blogs/what-trusted- ... hy-it-used

However, there are several problems with that reasoning:

1. EAC is not legally binding across all 50 states. They use words like "assist," "help," and "inform" a lot on their web site. I don't see the word "law" being used.

2. It requires trusting the people at EAC to identify and correct problems in the source code. That's a big task for them and a leap of faith for us.

3. The machine code verification can be spoofed at the user interface. A technician at a local election site needs to see the circuit board and wires. Laws might prevent opening the machines.

4. The machines may have hardware with wireless capability. This could allow programming from a car outside in the parking lot.

5. We can't trust only 1 technician to verify the code. We need technicians from competing parties to confirm that it's unaltered.